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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 20068
vs.
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE,
Defendent-Appellant,
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from a judgement and conviction of criminal
homicide, murder in the first degree, a capitol offense in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Philip R, Fishier, Judge, presiding*
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)

Case No.

20068

vs.
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE,

|

Defendant-Appellant,

;

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENTS OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged and convicted of criminal
homicide,

murder in the first degree under 76-5-202 (1) (g) Utah

Code Annotated 1953 as amended in connection with the stabbing
death of Sidney Ann Merrick, on September 26, 1983 in Summit
County, State of Utah, for which he received a life sentence.
This Court in State V. Tuttle
Adv. Rep. 6 (April 12, 1989)

, 106 Utah

reversed the capitol conviction,

finding that the applicable
constitutional,

P. 2

statute if construed to be

could not apply to the facts to sustain that

capitol conviction and therefore this Court reversed the
conviction and remanded the case back to the District Court for
entry of Judgement and conviction for Second Degree murder and
the imposition of an appropriate sentence.

Appellant in this

petition does not challenge that finding.
This Court however found two issues raised by Tuttle to
have been error but made the additional finding that such error
1

was harmless.

The court concluded that the admission of

hypnoticly enhanced testimony and the exclusion of expert
testimony regarding the effect of hypnosis

on a persons memory

were error but that such error was harmless.

It is those

findings of Harmless Error that Tuttle now requests the Court to
Review in connection with this Petition for Rehearing.
POINT I
THIS COURT HAS OVER LOOKED OR
M I S A P P R E H E N D E D THE FACTS IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE ADMISSION OF
HYPNOTICLY ENHANCED RECALL WAS
HARMLESS ERROR.
In finding that the admission of hypnoticly induced
recall was error but harmless the Court found that the evidence
of guilt was overwhelming.

In fashioning the harmless error rule

in Tuttle the Court directs its attention to several factors
which include the importance of the evidence, whether or not the
evidence was cumulative, whether

or not

there

was

any

corroboration of that tainted evidence with other non-tainted
testimony, and the overall strength of the States case against
the appellant.

In fashioning that rule this Court then concluded

that the State's case was very strong and that the hypnoticly
induced testimony was not important but cumulative and that other
relevant parts of the contested evidence had been corroborated by
other non-tainted evidence.
Appellant wishes to point out to the Court certain
facts which he believes were misapprehended or overlooked by this
Court in arriving at that decision.
2

HANDPRINT EVIDENCE. There was uncontroverted evidence
that a hand print located on the front bumper of the Merrick
vehicle did not match the hand print of either the appellant or
the victim.

This is significant because, as the testimony

established, this handprint was taken from the area on the bumper
where there was testimony indicating that a chain had been
attached to the automobile for the purpose of pulling or towing
the Merrick vehicle.

This evidence is significant in and of

itself but it becomes even more significant when understood in
view of other relevant testimony.

There was uncontroverted

testimony that a witness observed a white vehicle, similar to the
Merrick vehicle stopped on the side of the road with it's hood up
in and around the Lambs Canyon Area which is approximately 3
miles from the crime scene.

That same witness testified that

there were two people on the outside of that vehicle one of which
was a male and another of which was a female and that a pickup
truck, not appellant's truck, but another vehicle was parked near
the Merrick or the white vehicle.

FORCIBLY EXTRACTED HAIRS.

The one hair that may have

matched Tuttle's hair which was found in the Merrick vehicle had
not been forcibly extracted, or in other words pulled from the
head.

There was uncontroverted testimony that many hairs which

were conclusively established as not being either from the victim
or the appellant were found imbedded in Sidney Ann Merrick's
blood

soaked

shirt,

or inside the vehicle.
3

The clear

implication of this testimony is that some other person had been
in the vehicle with the victim at or about the time of the
homicide and had hairs pulled from his head.

Those hairs then

became imbedded in the victims blood soaked blouse.

The victim

was found lying on her back in the vehicle.
FINGERNAILS.

There was clear and

uncontroverted

testimony that the victims fingernails were bent back

indicating

that in resisting her attackers advances she had bent her
fingernails back, and there was also blood imbedded underneath
the fingernails.

This implies that whoever the perpetrator was,

that he would have had scratch marks on his arms as a result of
the victims

defensive

maneuvers.

The

testimony

was

uncontroverted that when Tuttle arrived in Evanston Wyoming that
evening he did not have any kind of scratch marks on his body at
all, including his arms which would have been exposed to the
victim's defensive maneuvers.

Once again the strong implication

is that a person other that Tuttle was the perpetrator of this
crime.
OTHER EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY.

While it is true that there was

other testimony from eyewitnesses identifying a black truck
towing a vehicle, there was also testimony indicating that at the
location of the homicide there was a white car, presumably the
Merrick vehicle, and in front of that white car there was a box
trailer with two individuals on the outside, one
the other a woman.

was a man and

The witness who testified to such a

description was an engineer with Gibbons and Reed and had
4

absolutely no interest in the investigation other than as a
disinterested eyewitness.

That person testified that he was

certain about that testimony because as he crested the Summit
there was glaring from the sun on the box trailer which attracted
his intention to that area.
The Court in focusing on the corroborative evidence
establishing the fact that Tuttle was present at the Summit and
had an opportunity to commit this crime simply ignores other
testimony from eyewitnesses which is inconsistent with the States
account of the events.
POINT II
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF IS NOT SUBJECT TO HARMLESS ERROR
ANALYSIS AND REQUIRES THIS COURT TO REVERSE HIS
CONVICTION AND ORDER A NEW TRIAL.
The defendant has the right to due precess of law under
Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution and its
Federal counter part.
The United States Supreme COurt in Chambers vs.
Mississippi, 92 S,Ct. 1038, 1945 (1973), held that
the right of an accused in a criminal trial to due
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity
to defend against the State's accusations. The right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call
witnesses in ones ' s own behalf have long been
recognized as essential to due process. Mr.Justice
Black writing for the Court In re: Oliver (citation
omitted), identified these rights as among the minimum
essentials of a fair trial: 'A person's right to
reasonable notice of a charge against him and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right to his
day in court - are basic in our system of juris
prudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel', (emphasis
5

added).
In Chapman v. State of California, supra the United
States Supreme Court held, in fashioning a constitutional
harmless error

rule that there were some constitutional rights

so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error.

Citing Payne vs. State of Arkansas,

356 U. S. 560 (Coerced confession), Gideon vs. Wainewriqht, 372
U.S. 355 (right to counsel), and Tumey vs. State of Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (Impartial judge).
The United States Supreme Court also held in Washington
vs, State of Texas, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1976), that due process
includes as a minimum the right to call witnesses and put on a
defense.
The United States Supreme Court in Rose vs. Clark, 39
Cr.L. 3278, (1986), applied the Chapman Constitutional Harmless
Error Rule to a Sandstrom burden shifting instruction, concluding
that such instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but
recognized

that some errors necessarily

fundamentally unfair.

render a trial

Noting at 39 Cr.L. 3279, F.N. 6, that each

of the examples, Chapman cited as error that could never be
harmless either aborted the basic trial process or denied it all
together,

and held at 39 Cr.L. 3279 as follows:

Harmless error analysis thus presupposes a trial at
which the defendant represented by counsel may present
evidence and argument before an impartial judge and
jury. (Emphasis added).
The United

States Supreme Court in Halloway vs.

arkansas , 98 S.Ct 1173, 1182 (1978), held that a claim of
6

conflicting interest by an attorney was not subject to harmless
error analysis pursuant to Chapman because it would consist of
speculation.

Where it said:

In the case of joint representation of conflicting
interest the evil - it bears repeating-is what the
advocate finds himself compelled to
refrain ^ from
doing; . . . . thus our inquiry into a claim oif
harmless error here would require, unlike most cases,
unquided speculation. (Emphasis added).
The error complained of here should not be subject to
Chapmans harmless error analysis because it aborted the "basic
trial process" i.e.. Mr. Tuttle's right to call Witnesses
to challenge the accuracy of an eye witness.

It is one thing to

find the introduction of tainted eyewitness testimony harmless.
It is quite another to refuse to allow Tuttle to explain to the
trier of facts the reasons why it is tainted.
It may well be that the jury believed in hypnosis much
like a group of grade school kids believe in Raveen
walking like chickens on stage.

and people

Tuttle should have been able to

explain to the jury what this court recognizes in this case that
hypnosis is unreliable and creates in the mind of a person
hypnotized a false sense of accuracy of recall which cannot be
broken down by even the most skilled of cross-examiners.
has been described as a search for truth.

A trial

We have no quarrel

with that proposition and in this case Tuttle should have been
able to present the truth on hypnosis.
CONCLUSION
The important interest in protecting constitutional
rights of all persons accused as well as protecting the central
7

i n t e g r i t y of the criminal j u s t i c e system r e q u i r e s t h a t Mr.
T u t t l e ' s conviction be reversed because the error complained of
denied Mr. T u t t l e t h e b a s i c t r i a l

p r o c e s s and under the

circumstances of t h i s case can never be harmless.
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court Counsel herein certifies that the Petition for Rehearing
filed herewith is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED the

day of May, 1989.
BROWN Sc COX

By
KENNETH R. BROWN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of May, 1989, I

mailed four copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to R.
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, and Sondra Sjogren, Assistant
Attorney General, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, Attorney
Generals Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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